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FELON-JURORS IN VACATIONLAND:
A FIELD STUDY OF TRANSFORMATIVE
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN MAINE
James M. Binnall*
ABSTRACT
Maine is the only jurisdiction in the United States that places no limitations on 
a convicted felon’s juror eligibility.  Instead, Maine screens prospective felon-jurors 
using their normal jury selection procedures.  In recent years, scholars have 
suggested that meaningful community engagement can help facilitate former 
offenders’ reintegration and criminal desistance.  From that theoretical posture, a 
number of empirical studies have explored the connection between participation in 
the electorate and the reentry of former offenders.  Those studies suggest that voting 
has the potential to prompt pro-social changes among former offenders.  Still, to date, 
no research has focused on jury service as a form of civic inclusion that may foster 
successful reintegration and criminal desistance.  Drawing on data derived from a 
large-scale field study in Maine, the present article addresses this research void, 
arguing that the jury is perfectly positioned as a tool for change, employable by 
jurisdictions seeking to facilitate the successful reentry of former offenders.  This 
article further notes that Maine is the only U.S. jurisdiction that has exploited this 
transformative power of the jury process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Maine is a unique place.  Home to horror writer Stephen King, Maine was the 
first state to ban the manufacture or sale of alcohol (which it did in 1851), earning 
the moniker “the birthplace of prohibition.”1 Maine is also the former toothpick 
capital of the world, and is where Harriet Beecher Stowe authored Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin.2 One of the coldest, most sparsely populated states, Maine boasts L.L. Bean’s 
flagship store, Paul Bunyan’s birthplace, and the only desert on the East Coast.3
Mainers take pride in the beauty and uniqueness of their home, suggesting that living 
in Maine is “the way life should be.” This article explores another distinctive feature 
                                                                                                     
* Dr. Binnall is a convicted felon who spent over four years in a maximum-security prison and 
almost three years on parole for a DUI homicide that claimed the life of his best friend.  He is now a 
member of the State Bar of California but is permanently prohibited from serving as a juror in that state, 
his experiences inform this Article.  Dr. Binnall would like to thank Danielle Rini and Laurie Minter for 
their invaluable research assistance on this article.
1. Anna Green, 25 Magnificent Facts About Maine, MENTAL FLOSS (Dec. 4, 2015), 
http://mentalfloss.com/article/71867/25-magnificent-facts-about-maine [https://perma.cc/23ET-WPM3]. 
2. Id.
3. Id.
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of Vacationland.4
Forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government 
statutorily restrict convicted felons’ eligibility for jury service.5 In twenty-eight 
jurisdictions, such restrictions are permanent, banning convicted felons from jury 
service for life.6 Thirteen jurisdictions bar convicted felons from jury service until 
the full completion of their sentence, notably disqualifying individuals serving 
felony-parole and felony-probation.7 Eight jurisdictions enforce hybrid regulations 
that may incorporate penal status, charge category, type of jury proceeding, and/or a 
term of years.8 And finally, two jurisdictions recognize lifetime for-cause 
challenges, permitting a trial judge to dismiss a prospective juror from the venire 
solely on the basis of a felony conviction.9 Maine is the only U.S. jurisdiction that 
places no restriction on a convicted felon’s opportunity to serve as a juror.10
Courts and lawmakers offer two justifications in support of these categorical 
felon-juror exclusions.11 The first alleges that convicted felons lack the character to 
perform the requisite duties of jury service.12 The second claims that felon-jurors 
would undermine the impartiality of a jury, arguing that convicted felons harbor an 
                                                                                                     
4. See generally Paul H. Millis, The Unheralded Champion of Maine’s ‘Vacationland’ License 
Plate Motto, THE DAILY BULLDOG (July 9, 2014), http://www.dailybulldog.com/db/opinion/the-
unheralded-champion-of-maines-vacationland-license-plate-motto/ [https://perma.cc/76ZT-AJK4].
5. James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the Presumptively Biased: Is There Empirical Support for 
Excluding Convicted Felons from Jury Service, 36 L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2014); James M. Binnall, 
Summonsing Criminal Desistance: Convicted Felons’ Perspectives on Jury Service, 43 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 4, 4 (2018). See generally Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U.
L. REV. 65 (2003).   
6. Binnall (2014), supra note 5, at 4 fig.1 (federal, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming).
7. Id. (Alaska, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin).
8. Id. (Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nevada, 
Oregon).  For example, the District of Columbia and Colorado adhere to differing hybrid models; the 
former excludes convicted felons from jury service during any period of supervision and for ten years 
following the termination of supervision, while the latter excludes convicted felons solely from grand 
jury proceedings. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-105(3) (LEXIS through 2018 Leg. Sess.); D.C. CODE §
11-1906(b)(2)(B) (2018). 
9. Binnall (2014), supra note 5, at 4 fig.1 (Illinois, Iowa).
10. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 1211 (2012) (“A prospective juror is disqualified to serve on a jury if that 
prospective juror is not a citizen of the United States, 18 years of age and a resident of the county, or is 
unable to read, speak and understand the English language.”).
11. In all but four jurisdictions, felon-juror exclusion statutes are categorical, barring all convicted 
felons from serving as jurors in all types of litigation.  The exceptions are Arizona (distinguishing first 
time offenders from repeat offenders); Colorado (distinguishing grand juries from petit juries); Nevada 
(distinguishing violent offenders from non-violent offenders); and Oregon (distinguishing civil cases 
from criminal cases). See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-912(A) (LEXIS through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-71-105(3) (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.157(2)(a)-(e) (2018); OR. REV. STAT. §
10.030(3)(a)(E)-(F) (2017).
12. See Kalt, supra note 5, at 167; see also Rector v. State, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173 (Ark. 1983) 
(“Unquestionably that exclusion is intended to bar from the jury box the one class of persons least likely 
to respect and give effect to the criminal laws.”).
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inherent bias, making each sympathetic to criminal defendants and adversarial 
toward prosecutorial agents.13 Taken together, the proffered justifications for felon-
juror exclusion assume that citizens with a felonious criminal history pose a 
significant threat to the jury process.  
Yet, this purported threat lacks empirical support.  Prior research focused on the 
character rationale for felon-juror exclusion demonstrates that convicted felons may 
actually enhance, rather than diminish, the deliberation process.14 Similarly, in 
studies of the inherent bias rationale, data demonstrates that felon-jurors pose no 
more of a threat to the impartiality of the jury than do other groups of eligible 
prospective jurors.15 Though few, these studies contradict the declared rationales for 
felon-juror exclusion statutes, ostensibly calling into question their necessity.  
While courts and lawmakers have considered the professed purposes for felon-
juror exclusion, they have seemingly overlooked the possible impacts of such 
restrictions.  Thirty-three percent of African American male adults have been 
convicted of a felony.16 These statistics suggest that felon-juror exclusion has a 
disproportionate racial impact.  Research supports this conclusion.  In the first 
empirical study of felon-juror exclusion, Wheelock found that the felon-juror 
exclusion racially homogenizes juries in several Georgia counties.17 In particular, 
he found that Georgia’s permanent felon-juror exclusion statute reduced the number 
of African-American men expected to serve as jurors from 1.65 to 1.17 per jury.18
As Wheelock notes, in many Georgia counties this effect was even more prominent, 
reducing the expected number of African-American male-jurors to under one, a 
significant reduction as prior research suggests that, in capital cases, juries with one 
African-American male are less likely to sentence a defendant to death than juries 
without an African-American male.19 In this way, felon-juror exclusion statutes may 
racially homogenize juries.
Apart from racially homogenizing juries, felon-juror exclusion may also give 
                                                                                                     
13. See Binnall (2014), supra note 5, at 11; see also Kalt, supra note 5, at 74 (“The other common 
basis offered for felon exclusion is that felons are inherently biased.”); Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 
P.2d 595, 600 (Cal. 1979) (“The Legislature could reasonably determine that a person who has suffered 
the most severe form of condemnation that can be inflicted by the state—a conviction of felony and 
punishment therefore—might well harbor a continuing resentment against ‘the system’ that punished 
him and equally unthinking bias in favor of the defendant on trial, who is seen as a fellow underdog 
caught in its toils.  Because these antisocial feelings would often be consciously or subconsciously 
concealed, the Legislature could further conclude that the risk of such prejudice infecting the trial 
outweighs the possibility of detecting it in jury selection proceedings.  The exclusion of ex-felons from 
jury service thus promotes the legitimate state goal of assuring impartiality of the verdict.”).
14. James M. Binnall, Jury Diversity in the Age of Mass Incarceration: An Exploratory Mock Jury 
Experiment Examining Felon-Jurors’ Potential Impacts on Deliberation Quality 20 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Maine Law Review).
15. Binnall (2014), supra note 5, at 6.
16. Sarah K.S. Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People with Felony 
Records in the United States, 1948-2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1814 (2017).
17. Darren Wheelock, A Jury of One’s Peers: Felon Jury Exclusion and Racial Inequality in 
Georgia Courts, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 335 (2012).
18. Id. at 352.
19. Id.
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rise to additional negative outcomes.  For example, research demonstrates that juror 
diversity increases the overall quality of deliberations.20 Studies also suggest that 
broad participation extends the educative reach of the jury, possibly prompting a 
subsequent increase in the rate at which former jurors take part in political 
processes.21 Diversity of service also legitimizes jury verdicts, especially for 
traditionally marginalized citizens.22 By excluding convicted felons from the venire, 
felon-juror exclusion statutes defeat these potential benefits of widespread 
participation in the jury process.
Though felon-juror exclusion challenges the established benefits of broad jury 
participation and diverse juries, this article focuses on a different, more attenuated 
impact of felon-juror exclusion statutes.  In their influential article, Bazemore and 
Stinchcomb suggest that civic engagement can facilitate successful reentry.23 They 
argue that for former offenders, participatory democracy fosters successful 
reintegration and criminal desistance through pro-social changes in self-concept, 
pro-social role commitment, and the building of social capital and collective 
efficacy.24 Subsequent empirical studies provide modest support for these 
contentions, suggesting that engagement with political processes, in the form of 
voting, may facilitate the successful reintegration and criminal desistance of former 
offenders.25
                                                                                                     
20. See Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson & Phoebe Ellsworth, The Effects of Death 
Qualification on Jurors’ Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 53, 76 (1984); see also Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
659, 706-07 (2002); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying 
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
597 (2006).
21. See John Gastil, E. Pierre Deess & Phil J. Weiser, Civic Awakening in the Jury Room: A Test of 
the Connection Between Jury Deliberation and Civic Participation, 64 J. POL. 585, 593-94 (2002) 
[hereinafter Gastil et al., Civic Awakening]; see also JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY:
HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 129-53
(2010); John Gastil et al., Jury Service and Electoral Participation: A Test of the Participation 
Hypothesis, 70 J. POL. 351 (2008) [hereinafter Gastil et al., Participation Hypothesis]; John Gastil & 
Phil J. Weiser, Jury Service as an Invitation to Citizenship: Assessing the Civic Value of 
Institutionalized Deliberation, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 605, 608-09 (2006).
22. See Leslie Ellis & Shari Siedman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering 
and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1039 (2003); see also NEIL VIDMAR &
VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 340 (2007); Hiroshi Fukurai & Darryl Davies, 
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection: Racially Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and Affirmative 
Juries of the Hennepin Model and the Jury De Medietate Linguae, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 645, 645-
46 (1997); Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal Jury,
12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1988); Joshua Wilkenfeld, Newly Compelling: Reexamining Judicial 
Construction of Juries in the Aftermath of Grutter v. Bollinger, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2292, 2306-13 
(2004). 
23. See Gordon Bazemore & Jeanne B. Stinchcomb, Civic Engagement and Reintegration: Toward 
a Community-Focused Theory and Practice, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 241, 244 (2004).
24. See id. at 244-45.
25. See Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza & Angela Behrens, ‘Less than the Average Citizen’: 
Stigma, Role Transition, and the Civic Reintegration of Convicted Felons, in AFTER CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT: PATHWAYS TO OFFENDER REINTEGRATION 261-86 (Shadd Maruna et al. eds., 2004) 
[hereinafter Uggen et al., Pathways]; see also JEFF MANZA, CHRISTOPHER UGGEN & ANGELA BEHRENS,
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Building on and expanding this line of research, I argue that civic engagement 
through jury service can promote the successful reentry of former offenders.  Using 
Maine as a laboratory, I conducted an exploratory field study from 2012-2015, 
examining (1) convicted felons’ views of Maine’s jury system and their role in that 
system,26 and (2) court personnel’s views of convicted felons and their inclusion in 
Maine’s jury process.27 Drawing on these findings, I contend that jury service is 
optimally positioned as a vehicle for furthering reintegration and criminal desistance, 
and that Maine is a model for reform.  
Part II details the evolution of inclusive juror eligibility criteria in the United 
States.  Part III provides an overview of the history of felon-juror exclusion, noting 
Maine’s divergence from the majority of U.S. jurisdictions.  Part IV presents findings 
from the first field study to focus on Maine’s unique policy of felon-juror inclusion.  
Part V situates those findings in a broader discussion of civic engagement and 
successful reintegration/criminal desistance, drawing on Bazemore and 
Stinchcomb’s theoretical model and subsequent studies on the topic.  Part VI 
concludes, suggesting that juries can enhance reentry initiatives and highlighting 
Maine’s unique policy of inclusion.
II. THE AMERICAN JURY: A HISTORY OF INCREASING INCLUSIVITY
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to 
a trial by an impartial jury.28 Traditionally, the Supreme Court interpreted this 
“impartiality doctrine”29 as applying solely to individual jurors.30 Under that view, 
the Sixth Amendment mandated only that a jury include those free of bias or those 
able to set aside biases and “conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.”31
Yet, in a series of cases beginning in 1940, the Court altered its interpretation of 
the impartiality doctrine.  Under this new interpretation, the Court emphasized that 
impartiality requires not only unbiased jurors, but also a representative jury 
                                                                                                     
LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 137-63 (2006) [hereinafter 
MANZA ET AL., LOCKED OUT]; Binnall (2018), supra note 5; Bryan Lee Miller & Joseph F. Spillane, 
Civil Death: An Examination of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and Reintegration, 14 PUNISHMENT &
SOC’Y 402, 422-23 (2012).
26. See Binnall (2018), supra note 5.
27. See James M. Binnall, Exorcising Presumptions: Judges and Attorneys Contemplate ‘Felon-
Juror Inclusion’ in Maine,” JUST. SYS. J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 26-27), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3226728 [perma.cc/JL3Z-YTHR].
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
29. See generally Meiring de Villiers, The Impartiality Doctrine: Constitutional Meaning and 
Judicial Impact, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 71 (2010); Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality 
Array? A Structural Theory of the Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173 (1995).
30. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936); 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM 
AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY, 105-15 (1994). 
31. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 742 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Wainwright v. 
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985)); see also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990); Lockhart v. McCree, 
476 U.S. 162 (1986); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 298 (1892); Mark Cammack, In Search of 
the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L. J. 405 (1995). 
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comprised of diverse views and perspectives.32 The Court theorized that varied life 
experiences necessarily yield richer and higher quality deliberations.33 The Supreme 
Court’s decisions regarding jury inclusiveness divide into roughly two categories: 
those focused on the formation of the jury venire and those centered on the exercise 
of peremptory challenges.34 The exclusion of convicted felons from the jury pool 
occurs prior to the formation of the venire and thus implicates jurisprudence focused 
on discriminatory jury selection procedures early in the process.
As early as 1880, the Supreme Court invalidated a racially discriminatory jury 
selection scheme.  In Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court held that a statute 
prohibiting African-Americans from serving as jurors violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.35 Between 1880 and 1975, the Court 
intermittently struck down several overtly prejudicial jury selection procedures 
under the same equal protection analysis.36 In 1940, however, the Court seemingly 
began to alter its approach to such cases, reassessing the meaning of impartiality.
In Smith v. Texas, the Court overturned the appellant’s conviction, finding that 
African Americans were “systematically excluded from grand jury service solely on 
account of their race and color.”37 For the first time, the Court did not merely prohibit 
exclusion but also hinted that impartiality necessitates inclusion and 
representativeness.  The Court noted that “[i]t is part of the established tradition in 
the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly 
representative of the community.”38
Two years later, in Glasser v. United States, the Court again confronted a 
discriminatory jury selection scheme.39 The selection procedures in Glasser limited 
eligible women jurors to only members of the League of Women.40 Though the 
Court rejected Glasser’s claim for lack of evidence, the Court expanded on Smith’s 
holding, enunciating what has come to be known as the cross-section requirement.  
The Court stated,
[T]he officials charged with choosing federal jurors may exercise some discretion 
to the end that competent jurors may be called.  But they must not allow the desire 
for competent jurors to lead them into selections which do not comport with the
concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community.  Tendencies, no matter how 
slight, toward the selection of jurors by any method other than a process which will 
insure a trial by a representative group are undermining processes weakening the 
                                                                                                     
32. See ABRAMSON, supra note 30, at 115-18; Ellis & Diamond, supra note 22, at 1033-58. 
33. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972).
34. Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection, and Jury Selection: Denying that Race 
Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 511 (1994).
35. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879).
36. See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561-63 (1953); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 
465-69 (1947); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 357, 362 (1939); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 
(1938); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).   
37. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 129 (1940).
38. Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
39. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
40. Id. at 83-84.
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institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily resisted.41
Four years after Glasser, in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the 
Court again assessed discriminatory jury selection processes under fair cross-section 
principles.42 At issue in Thiel was the exclusion of daily wage earners from jury 
rolls.  Thiel claimed that engineering jury pools in such a way gave wealthy railroad 
owners an impermissible litigation advantage.  Building on their holding in Glasser,
the Court explained:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either 
criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from 
a cross-section of the community.  This does not mean, of course, that every jury 
must contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political 
and geographical groups of the community; frequently such complete representation 
would be impossible.  But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by 
court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups.  
Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be 
found in every stratum of society.  Jury competence is an individual rather than a 
group or class matter.  That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system.  To disregard 
it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent 
to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.43
In 1946, the Court also decided Ballard v. United States, and again invalidated 
a jury formation system because it excluded women—all women—from the jury 
pool.44 In Ballard, the Court once more stressed that a jury must represent the 
community from which it is drawn.45 The Court also held that by excluding women 
from juries, the selection procedures at issue deprived potential litigants of 
viewpoints that may impact deliberations and verdict outcomes.  As the Court 
carefully explained,
[i]t is said . . . that an all-male panel drawn from the various groups within a 
community will be as truly representative as if women were included.  The thought 
is that the factors which tend to influence the action of women are the same as those 
which influence the action of men—personality, background, economic status—and 
not sex. Yet it is not enough to say that women when sitting as jurors neither act 
nor tend to act as a class.  Men likewise do not act as a class. But if the shoe were 
on the other foot, who would claim that a jury was truly representative of the 
community if all men were intentionally and systematically excluded from the 
panel?  The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up 
exclusively of one is different from a community composed of both; the subtle 
interplay of influence one on the other is among the imponderables.  To insulate the 
courtroom from either may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a 
flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded. The exclusion of one may 
indeed make the jury less representative of the community than would be true if an 
                                                                                                     
41. Id. at 86 (emphasis added),
42. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
43. Id. at 220 (internal citations omitted).
44. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
45. Id. at 195.
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economic or racial group were excluded.46
Though the Court alluded to the cross-sectional requirement in Smith, Glasser, 
Thiel, and Ballard, the Court decided those cases based on its supervisory powers 
over federal courts and federal jury selection procedures.  The next step in the 
evolution of the cross-section requirement did not come until 1968 with the Jury 
Selection and Service Act (“JSSA”).47 The JSSA states,
[A]ll litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand 
and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community . . . 
[and] all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand 
and petit juries in the district courts of the United States . . . .48
Thus, with the JSSA, Congress codified the cross-section requirement and the 
policy of inclusion promulgated by the Court during the 1940s.
Soon after the passage of the JSSA, in 1975, the Supreme Court 
constitutionalized the cross-section requirement.  The Court did so by expanding its 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s impartiality doctrine.  In Taylor v. 
Louisiana, the Court held that “the selection of a petit jury from a representative 
cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial.”49 Taylor represents the Court’s official recognition of the cross-
section doctrine as a constitutionally guaranteed right of a litigant.
The cross-section requirement demonstrates the Court’s clear preference for 
inclusive jury selection procedures.  Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the 
Court’s preference for inclusiveness and the development of the cross-section 
requirement are rooted in a reinterpretation of the notion of impartiality.  In a sense, 
the Court has determined that an impartial jury requires a mix of biases and 
prejudices.50 In turn, as precedent makes clear, the Court contemplates the 
possibility that exclusion of any group or class from jury service can result in less 
effective deliberations and potentially inaccurate verdicts.  Still, the vast majority of 
U.S. jurisdictions banish convicted felons from the jury service, seemingly in direct 
contention with the spirit of the cross-section doctrine, assuming that the inclusion 
of convicted felons would diminish rather than bolster the deliberation process. 
III. THE HISTORY OF FELON-JUROR EXCLUSION: MAINE BREAKS RANKS
Unlike the U.S. history of inclusive juror eligibility, the history of felon-juror 
exclusion is rather unremarkable.  The practice of excluding convicted felons from 
the jury process originated in ancient Greece.  Ancient Greek law characterized 
convicted criminals as “infamous,” prohibiting them from taking part in all civic 
activities.  The ancient Greeks imposed such sanctions retributively and as a general 
deterrent to other potential criminal offenders.  Later, the Romans also adopted a 
                                                                                                     
46. Id. at 193-94 (emphasis added).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000).
48. Id.
49. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
50. ABRAMSON, supra note 30, at 10-11.
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version of “infamy,” developing a series of complex statutes outlining civic 
disabilities that applied to convicted criminals.51 After the fall of the Roman Empire, 
Germanic tribes imposed civic exclusion through a process of “outlawry.”52 That 
process conceived of crime as an offense against society, authorizing society to 
retaliate by, in part, stripping offenders of their civil rights.53 As English law 
evolved, outlawry transformed into the more formal process of “attainder.”54
Citizens convicted of serious felonies were labeled “attained,” and suffered “civil 
death” whereby they forfeited all civil rights and were prohibited from participating 
in most civic activities.55 One such activity was appearing in court as a juror.56
Around the time of the Founding, while colonists fought to break free of English 
rule, the concepts of “civil death” and the exclusion of convicted felons from jury 
service were part of early American jurisprudence.  As early as 1799, several states 
imposed civil death statutes.57 The development of such statutes signals a trend in 
the history of civic restrictions—the unquestioning adoption of traditional practices.
Along these lines, the only significant development in the history of felon-juror 
exclusion in America was the transition from subjective to objective juror eligibility 
criteria.58 Around 1800, while criminal history was not a formal disqualification 
from juror service, the common law, civil death statutes, and other narrowing 
requirements (such as requirements that jurors be male property owners of good 
character) ensured that convicted felons almost never found their way onto a jury.59
Only later, in 1850, when voting and jury service were formally extended to larger 
segments of the population, did jurisdictions begin to statutorily restrict juror 
eligibility.60 By the early 1900s, felon-juror exclusion statutes were relatively 
common in the United States.61
Since the early 1900s, jurisdictional policies regarding felon-juror exclusion 
have fluctuated only minimally, sometimes evolving towards less restrictive 
eligibility criteria and often towards more restrictive eligibility criteria.  Today, 
Maine is the only U.S. jurisdiction that does not restrict the opportunity for convicted 
felons to take part in jury service, but that was not always the case.  Early in Maine’s 
history, it too excluded convicted felons from the jury process.
In 1652, the Massachusetts Bay Colony annexed what is now the state of Maine.  
                                                                                                     
51. Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A 
Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 347, 351 (1968).
52. Walter Matthews Grant et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 
VAND. L. REV. 929, 942 (1970). 
53. H. Erle Richards, Is Outlawry Obsolete?, 18 L. Q. REV. 297, 298 (1902).
54. Grant et al., supra note 52, at 942.
55. Id. at 942-43.
56. Id. at 942.
57. Id. at 950.
58. Kalt, supra note 5, at 178.
59. See id. at 178-79; see generally Alec. C. Ewald, ‘Civil Death’: The Ideological Paradox of 
Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 1045 (2002); Alec C.
Ewald & Marnie Smith, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions in American Courts; The 
View from the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 145 (2008).  
60. See Kalt, supra note 5, at 179-80.
61. Kalt, supra note 5, at 184.
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From 1652 until the passage of the 1802-1803 Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts 
(“Acts and Resolves”), English common law governed juror eligibility in that region.  
Under English common law, only liberos et legales homines (free and lawful men) 
were eligible to take part in the jury process.62 That exclusion continued with the 
Acts and Resolves (Massachusetts, 1802-1803).  Chapter 92 of the Acts and Resolves 
states “if any person, whose name shall be put into either (jury selection) box, shall 
be convicted of any Scandalous crime, or be guilty of any gross immorality, his name 
shall be withdrawn from the Box, by the Selectmen of his town.”63 Thus, early in its 
history, Maine prohibited convicted felons from serving on juries.  In 1820, as part 
of the Missouri Compromise, Maine achieved statehood and continued to track 
Massachusetts’s policy of mandatorily excluding convicted felons from jury 
service.64 From 1821 to 1981, the mandatory language of Maine’s felon jury 
exclusion policy went virtually unchanged, stating that jury commissioners “shall” 
disqualify prospective jurors “convicted of a scandalous crime” or a “gross 
immorality.”65
Maine’s policy regarding felonious jurors underwent its first substantive 
revision in 1971, when it tied a convicted felon’s right to sit on a jury to his right to 
vote.66 The provision read, “[a] prospective juror is disqualified to serve on a jury if 
he . . . has lost the right to vote.”67 This language, however, did not change convicted 
felons’ status, as Maine has never curtailed their right to vote.68 In 1981, Maine 
repealed Section 1254’s mandatory exclusion of prospective jurors “convicted of any
scandalous crime or gross immorality,”69 and removed the provision linking juror 
eligibility to voting rights.70 The present statute governing juror eligibility in Maine 
makes no mention of convicted felons.  In effect, Maine has allowed convicted felons
to serve as jurors since 1981 and is now the only jurisdiction that places no restriction 
on their opportunity to serve.
IV. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, CRIMINAL DESISTANCE, AND JURY SERVICE
Traditionally, scholars and practitioners have viewed former offenders’ levels 
of community engagement as an outcome measure of reintegration and criminal 
desistance.71 Such a view holds that reintegration and criminal desistance, if 
                                                                                                     
62. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352.
63. Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 92, 1802-1803 Mass. Acts 173.
64. P.L. 1821, ch. 84, § 3.
65. R.S. ch. 135, § 6 (1841) (from 1821 to 1981, Maine law mandatorily excluded convicted felons 
from jury service.)
66. P.L. 1971, ch. 391, § 1.
67. Id. 
68. See 21-A M.R.S.A. § 112 (2017). In an email on November 11, 2011, Sue Wright, reference 
librarian for the Maine State Law and Legislature Reference Library, confirmed that Maine has never 
taken away convicted felons’ right to vote. 
69. P.L. 1981, ch. 705, § G13.
70. Id. § G4.
71. See generally Sherri Doherty, Pamela Forrester, Amanda Brazil & Flora I. Matheson, Finding 
Their Way: Conditions for Successful Reintegration Among Women Offenders, 53 J. OFFENDER REHAB.
562 (2014); Elaine Gunnison & Jaqueline B. Helfgott, Factors that Hinder Offender Reentry Success: A 
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successful, will result in the community engagement of former offenders.72 Other 
scholars argue that community engagement is a necessary precursor to successful 
reintegration and successful criminal desistance.73 Taking this view, former 
offenders’ success requires that they be given opportunities to take part in political, 
social, and civic processes.74 The jury, this article suggests, is an apt opportunity for 
meaningful community engagement that can spawn pro-social change among former 
offenders.
Bazemore and Stinchcomb argue that civic engagement through democratic 
participation can facilitate successful reintegration.75 In particular, they note that 
civic engagement fosters pro-social change at the micro, intermediate, and macro 
levels.76 They suggest that civic engagement facilitates change in the self-concept 
of former offenders at the micro level.77 At the intermediate level, they argue that 
civic engagement provides former offenders with pro-social roles, offering guidance 
and structure that curbs criminality.78 Finally, at the macro level, Bazemore and 
Stinchcomb contend that civic engagement builds social capital and creates 
collective efficacy in a community.  They assert that this efficacy serves as a check 
on criminal behavior by strengthening bonds within the community and making it 
more likely that the community can detect and prevent criminal activity at its early 
stages.79
Bazemore and Stinchcomb’s argument, proffered in the context of felon voter 
enfranchisement, does not consider jury service, an institution proven to prompt 
changes among its participants and which is arguably the most direct form of 
democratic participation.80 Likewise, subsequent empirical research on civic 
                                                                                                     
View from Community Corrections Officers, 55 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY
287 (2011); Alison J. Shinkfield & Joseph Graffam, Community Reintegration of Ex-Prisoners: Type 
and Degree of Change in Variables Influencing Successful Reintegration, 53 INT’L J. OFFENDER
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 29 (2009).
72. Shinkfield & Graffam, supra note 71.
73. See Kathryn J. Fox, Theorizing Community Integration as Desistance-Promotion, 42 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 82, 91 (2015); see generally Gordon Bazemore & Carsten Erbe, Operationalizing the 
Community Variable in Offender Reintegration: Theory and Practice for Developing Intervention Social 
Capital, 1 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 246 (2003).
74. Fox, supra note 73, at 91.
75. See Bazemore & Stinchcomb, supra note 23.
76. See generally id.
77. Id. at 247 (“First, at the micro or social-psychological level, interactionist theories have focused 
attention on how the transformation of offender identities has promoted desistance and reintegration.”).
78. Id. at 248 (“At the mid-range level, a second body of literature in life course research has 
documented the importance of informal social control, community support, and conventional 
commitments to formal roles in families, work, and other institutions as former offenders make the 
transition from involvement in criminal activity to law-abiding lifestyles.” (emphasis omitted)).
79. Id. at 249-50 (“This community level research in the tradition of social disorganization theory 
emphasizes the differential capacity of communities to develop shared norms and values and build 
relationships of trust and reciprocity as social capital.  Such social capital is believed to provide the basis 
for collective efficacy, or the capacity of community members to intervene effectively in response to 
crime and disorder.” (emphasis omitted)).
80. GASTIL ET AL., supra note 21, at 49; Gastil et al., Civic Awakening, supra note 21, at 592; 
Gastil et al., Participation Hypothesis, supra note 21; Gastil & Weiser, supra note 21, at 615.
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engagement and criminal desistance focuses only on the statutory restrictions on 
felon voting.81 Prior research on criminal desistance and the power of the jury as a 
transformative change agent suggests that like voting, jury service can facilitate the 
successful reentry of former offenders.
A.  Theories of Criminal Desistance
Criminal desistance is a difficult concept to operationalize.82 Over time, 
scholars have subscribed to varying conceptions of the topic.83 Drawing on Edwin 
Lemert’s theory of deviance,84 several scholars suggest that cessation of criminal 
conduct does not by itself amount to criminal desistance.85 Instead, criminal 
desistance divides into three phases: primary desistance, secondary desistance, and 
tertiary desistance.86
Primary desistance refers to any break from criminal activity,87 duration 
notwithstanding.88 Yet, such a break can be fleeting.  Consider Maruna’s reference 
to an old joke, “stopping smoking is easy—I do it every week.”89 This quip 
succinctly captures the fleeting nature of primary desistance.90
Secondary desistance, on the other hand, involves both a break from criminal 
activity and a marked pro-social change in the self-concept of the former offender.91
As Maruna et al. explain, the key distinctions between primary and secondary 
desistance then are “identifiable and measurable changes at the level of personal 
                                                                                                     
81. See, e.g., Uggen et al., Pathways, supra note 25, at 277. 
82. Sam King, Early Desistance Narratives: A Qualitative Analysis of Probationers’ Transitions 
Towards Desistance, 15 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 147, 148 (2013).
83. See, e.g., Anthony Bottoms et al., Towards Desistance: Theoretical Underpinnings for 
Empirical Study, 43 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 368 (2004); Shawn D. Bushway et al., An Empirical 
Framework for Studying Desistance as a Process, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 491, 491-92 (2001).
84. See generally EDWIN M. LEMERT, SOCIAL PATHOLOGY: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO THE 
THEORY OF SOCIOPATHIC BEHAVIOR (1951).
85. See SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND REBUILD THEIR 
LIVES 26-27 (2001).
86. Shadd Maruna, Russ Immarigeon & Thomas P. LeBel, Ex-Offender Reintegration: Theory and 
Practice, in AFTER CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: PATHWAYS TO OFFENDER REINTEGRATION 19 (2004) 
(primary and secondary criminal desistance); Fox, supra note 73, at 91-92 (tertiary criminal desistance).
87. Maruna et al., supra note 86, at 19 (defining “primary desistance” as a “lull or crime-free gap in 
the course of a criminal career”).
88. Id.
89. MARUNA, supra note 85, at 17.  This quote was originally attributed to Harris Dickson who, in 
response to an inquiry about whether he had quit playing poker replied, “I have; I’ve quit more’n a 
thousand times, every time the game breaks up.” HARRIS DICKSON, DUKE OF DEVIL-MAY-CARE 14-15 
(1905).
90. MARUNA, supra note 85, at 23 (“For example, a person can steal a purse on a Tuesday 
morning, then terminate criminal participation for the rest of the day.  Is that desistance?  Is it desistance 
if the person does not steal another purse for a week?  A month? A year?”). 
91. See id.; see also NEAL SHOVER, GREAT PRETENDERS: PURSUITS AND CAREERS OF PERSISTENT 
THIEVES (1996); Peggy C. Giordano, Stephen, A. Cernkovich & Jennifer L. Rudolph, Gender, Crime, 
and Desistance: Toward a Theory of Cognitive Transformation, 107 AM. J. SOC. 990 (2002); Barry 
Vaughan, The Internal Narrative of Desistance, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 390 (2007).
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identity or the ‘me’ of the individual.”92 How changes in a former offender’s self-
concept occur involves both intrinsic motivations and external, structural forces.93
Shadd Maruna’s exceptional research on criminal desistance suggests that 
former offenders take an active role in their own desistance process.  Specifically, 
someone who successfully desists from criminal activity must, at some point in the 
desistance process, rectify their criminal past with their new and anticipated law-
abiding present and future.94 To do so, former offenders build “desistance 
narratives” to explain, not excuse, past deviance.95 One method of explanation 
involves the reframing of a criminal past into a constructive experience, deriving 
meaning and value from prior deviance.96
Structure-centric views of criminal desistance take on various forms.  Life-
course theory argues that life events or “turning points” like marriage and 
employment shape former offenders’ attitudes and behaviors.97 They shape former 
offenders in two ways: (1) as a model promoting pro-social behaviors and (2) as a 
boundary inhibiting anti-social behaviors.98 When an offender fills a pro-social role, 
he or she is informally provided a “skeleton script” for criminal desistance.99 He or 
she is also informally saddled with strictures that constrain attitudes and behaviors 
that may prompt criminality.100
                                                                                                     
92. Maruna et al. supra note 86, at 19.
93. Binnall (2018), supra note 5, at 7.
94. MARUNA, supra note 85, at 87 (“[D]esisting narrators . . . maintain this equilibrium by 
connecting negative past experiences to the present in such a way that the present good seems an almost 
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95. Id.; see also King, supra note 82, at 152 (“[I]t is the building of a desistance narrative which 
underpins the development of new identities . . . .”); Giordano et al., supra note 94; Vaughan, supra note 94.
96. MARUNA, supra note 85, at 98 (“Sometimes the benefits of having experienced crime and drug 
use are literal . . . .  Ex-offenders say they have learned from their past lives, and this knowledge has 
made them wiser people.”).  Maruna also notes that this reframing of a criminal past often occurs 
through the use of what he terms a “redemption script.” Id. at 87.
97. John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Turning Points in the Life Course: Why Change Matters to 
the Study of Crime, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 301, 304 (1993); Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, A Life-
Course View of the Development of Crime, 602 ANNALS OF THE AMER. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI.
2005, at 12, 38; see also ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS 
AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE (1993) (referring to “turning points” as “triggering events”).
98. See, e.g., JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON, SHARED BEGINNINGS, DIVERGENT LIVES:
DELINQUENT BOYS TO AGE 70 (2003) [hereinafter LAUB & SAMPSON, Shared Beginnings]; Ross L. 
Matseuda & Karen Heimer, A Symbolic Interactionist Theory of Role Transitions, Role Commitments, 
and Delinquency, in DEVELOPMENTAL THEORIES OF CRIM. & DELINQUENCY (1997) [hereinafter 
Matseuda & Heimer, Symbolic Interactionist]; Karen Heimer & Ross L. Matseuda, Role-Taking, Role 
Commitment, and Delinquency: A Theory of Differential Social Control, 59 AMER. SOC. REV. 365 
(1994) [hereinafter Heimer & Matseuda, Role-Taking]; John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, 
Understanding Desistance From Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Laub & Sampson, 
Understanding]; Ross L. Matsueda, Reflected Appraisals, Parental Labeling, and Delinquency: 
Specifying a Symbolic Interactionist Theory, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1577 (1992). 
99. Judith Rumgay, Scripts for Safer Survival: Pathways Out of Female Crime, 43 HOW. J. CRIM.
JUST. 405 (2004); see also Giordano et al., supra note 91, at 1035 (referring to this concept as “cognitive 
blueprints”).
100. See Heimer & Matsueda, Role-Taking, supra note 98; LAUB & SAMPSON, Shared Beginnings,
supra note 98; Laub & Sampson, Understanding, supra note 98.
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Tertiary criminal desistance is the last phase of the criminal desistance process 
and accounts more fully for sociological factors.101 As McNeil explains, tertiary 
criminal desistance occurs when an offender becomes—perhaps for the first time—
comfortable as a member of any given community.102 During this phase of the 
desistance process, aggregate or macro level, external forces promote criminal 
desistance by increasing a former offender’s social capital and building a level of 
collective efficacy in the community.103 At this point, complete immersion in the 
community serves to curb criminality and operates as a necessary precursor to 
successful desistance.104
B.  Felon-Voters and Criminal Desistance
To date, only two empirical studies have explored civic participation as a means 
of promoting criminal desistance.105 Yet, these studies focus exclusively on voting 
and tend to demonstrate that participation in the electorate can prompt pro-social 
identity changes.106 More specifically, such research suggests that such changes are 
the result of intrinsic motivations (micro level),107 and structural variables 
(intermediate level).108
In the first empirical study of civic participation as a possible promoter of 
criminal desistance, Uggen et al. interviewed thirty-three prisoners, parolees, and 
probationers in Minnesota.109 They found that subjects “link successful adult role 
transition to desistance from crime”110 and that former offenders’ civic role 
commitments contribute to the development and maintenance of a law-abiding 
identity.111 In particular, they suggest that findings tend to show that “civic 
                                                                                                     
101. Fergus McNeill, Three Aspects of Desistance?, IRISS (May 23, 2014), 
https://blogs.iriss.org.uk/discoveringdesistance/2014/05/.
102. Kathryn J. Fox, Civic Commitment: Promoting Desistance Through Community Integration, 18 
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103. See generally McNeill, supra note 101; Rachel N. Horan, Restorative Justice: The Relevance of 
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104. Fox, supra note 102, at 69 (“Much of the recent literature on desistance agrees on a simple but 
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Lederman, Norman Loayza & Ana Maria Menendez, Violent Crime: Does Social Capital Matter?, 50  
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105. MANZA ET AL., LOCKED OUT, supra note 25, at 137-63; Uggen et al., Pathways, supra note 25, 
at 261-86; Miller & Spillane, supra note 25. But see Binnall (2018), supra note 5, at 4 (in this prior 
article, I discuss the possibility that jury service may facilitate criminal desistance).
106. MANZA ET AL., LOCKED OUT, supra note 25, at 137-63; Uggen et al., Pathways, supra note 25, 
at 261-86; Miller & Spillane, supra note 25 (the first two studies listed analyze the same data).
107. Miller & Spillane, supra note 25.
108. MANZA ET AL., LOCKED OUT, supra note 25, at 137-63; Uggen et al., Pathways, supra note 25, 
at 261-86.
109. Uggen et al., Pathways, supra note 25, at 267.
110. Id. at 286.
111. Id.
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reintegration and establishing an identity as a law-abiding citizen are central to the 
process of desistance from crime.”112 Analyzing the same data set, Manza et al. 
found that former offenders “think of themselves as citizens” and desire to fulfill 
civic roles.113 Also emphasizing role commitments, they explain that “to the extent 
that felons begin to vote and participate as citizens in their communities, there is 
some evidence that they will bring their behavior in line with the citizen role, 
avoiding further contact with the criminal justice system.”114
In the second study exploring the possible effects of record-based voting restrictions 
on criminal desistance and reintegration, Miller and Spillane conducted semi-structured 
interviews with fifty-four disenfranchised convicted felons.115 Thirty-nine percent of 
participants viewed felon-voter disenfranchisement statutes as “limiting, psychologically 
harmful, and stigmatizing,” perceiving them to have an indirect impact on their ability to 
successfully reintegrate.116 Data suggests that disenfranchisement negatively impacts the 
criminal desistance process by tying former offenders to their criminal pasts, making the 
reconceptualization or abandonment of a criminal identity nearly impossible.117
Highlighting the importance of a former offender’s ability to construct a plausible 
desistance narrative, Miller and Spillane caution that “scholars should remain alert to the 
manner in which long-term forms of invisible punishment impact ex-offenders’ ability to 
sustain the work of developing ‘a coherent prosocial identity for themselves.’”118
Taken together, empirical research on the prospect that civic reintegration—in 
the form of voting—suggests that casting a ballot facilitates criminal desistance.  At 
the micro level, suffrage alters the self-concept of those who live with a felony 
criminal conviction.  At the intermediate level, enfranchisement offers convicted 
felons a guide; a pro-social role to fill that promotes successful reintegration and 
criminal desistance.  At the macro level, taking part in the electoral process helps to 
build former offenders’ social capital by placing them in settings where new, pro-
social contacts are likely to occur.  Once established, such contacts create a 
community fabric that spawns a collective efficacy, whereby the community has a 
responsibility in the reentry process.  No prior study explores jury service as a means 
of prompting such changes among former offenders.119
C.  The Jury as a Change Agent
In his study of American democracy, Tocqueville recognized that the jury was more 
than merely a fact-finding tribunal: “To regard the jury simply as a judicial institution 
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119. But cf. Binnall (2018), supra note 5 (discussing the possibility that jury service may facilitate 
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would be taking a very narrow view of the matter . . . .”120 Instead, Tocqueville conceived 
of the jury as a tool for educating citizens on the importance of participatory 
democracy.121 Tocqueville opined that the jury “vests each citizen with a kind of 
magistracy,” and teaches everyone “that they have duties toward society and that they 
take a share in its government.”122 Years after Tocqueville’s writings, commentators and 
courts have consistently lauded the jury as a crucial, educative form of civic inclusion.123
Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he opportunity for ordinary citizens to 
participate in the administration of justice has long been recognized as one of the principal 
justifications for retaining the jury system."124 Similarly, Justice Breyer has reiterated the 
power of “active liberty.”125 As Breyer explains, “active liberty . . . refers to a sharing of 
a nation's sovereign authority among its people.”126 Proponents of the jury argue that 
jury service stands as “[t]he most stunning and successful experiment in direct popular 
sovereignty in all history . . . .”127
Though no prior research explores how felon-jurors experience the jury process, 
studies of non-felon-jurors suggest that serving as a juror can prompt positive
attitudinal and behavioral changes.128 The “deliberative participation hypothesis”129
holds that citizen deliberation fosters further or additional civic activity by promoting 
                                                                                                     
120. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 250 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., 
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efforts, the judge’s advice, and also the very passions of the litigants bring within his mental grasp.”).
122. Id.
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political efficacy among participants.130 Studies of the effects of jury service on non-
felons support this hypothesis.  
In her innovative dissertation research, Consolini found that jurors, especially first-
time trial jurors, felt “more politically efficacious and community-oriented following jury 
service.”131 Along these lines, Gastil and Weiser discovered that jury service fosters a 
general sense of empowerment that frequently leads to other forms of civic 
engagement.132 Studies reveal a four to ten percent increase in voting rates among former 
jurors,133 and a positive correlation between jury service and higher levels of involvement 
in civic and political activities.134 This “participation effect” is most prominent for 
citizens who—like many convicted felons—were less civically or politically engaged 
prior to jury service.135 Discussing the benefits of jury service, Gastil et al. explain, 
“organizers of orchestrated deliberative events should ensure broad participation and 
make special efforts to include underrepresented populations . . . beyond the general 
ethical imperative of inclusion that is essential to democracy, our data suggest that these 
populations might benefit the most from the deliberative experience.”136
Activities that build a former offender’s self-concept, provide pro-social roles, 
and promote civic immersion tend to promote criminal desistance.  In turn, research 
tends to show that taking part in the electoral process triggers these desistance 
mechanisms.  In studies of non-felon-jurors, evidence suggests that the jury can 
positively transform those who take part.  Drawing on empirical evidence, I argue 
that, like voting, serving as a juror has the potential to initiate desistance processes 
among former offenders.
V. MAINE’S UNIQUELY INCLUSIVE JURY SYSTEM: A FIELD STUDY
From 2012 to 2015, I conducted a field study in Maine.  That field study consisted 
of a series of semi-structured, in-depth interviews with two groups of participants: (1) 
prospective and former felon-jurors,137 and (2) court personnel involved in the screening 
of felon-jurors (trial judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys).138 Each interview was 
fully transcribed and subject to an open-coding, thematic approach to data analysis.139
                                                                                                     
130. Id. at 587; see also DAVID MATTHEWS, POLITICS FOR PEOPLE: FINDING A RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC 
VOICE (1994); Mark Button & Kevin Mattson, Deliberative Democracy in Practice: Challenges and 
Prospects for Civic Deliberation, 31 POLITY 609 (1999).
131. Consolini, supra note 128, at 186.
132. Gastil et al., Civic Awakening, supra note 21, at 587, 593-94; Gastil et al., Participation 
Hypothesis, supra note 21, at 364.
133. Gastil et al., Civic Awakening, supra note 21, at 591.
134. Id. at 593-94; see also Gastil et al., Participation Hypothesis, supra note 21, at 365.
135. Gastil et al., Participation Hypothesis, supra note 21, at 364.
136. Id. (citing Archon Fung, Deliberation’s Darker Side: Six Questions for Iris Marion Young and 
Jane Mansbridge, 93 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 47, at 47).
137. See Binnall (2018), supra note 5, at 7-8 (describing participant data).
138. See Binnall, supra note 27 (manuscript at 11-12) (describing participant data).
139. KRISTIN G. ESTERBERG, QUALITATIVE METHODS IN SOCIAL RESEARCH (2001); MARTIN 
SCHREIER, QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS IN PRACTICE (2012); see also Binnall (2018), supra note 
5, at 8 (describing in detail the methods for each participant group); Binnall, supra note 27 (manuscript 
at 12) (same).
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Findings reveal that Bazemore and Stinchcomb’s hypothesis derives support from both 
former offenders and court personnel.140
A.  Micro Level Impacts
At the individual or micro level, civic engagement through jury service may 
prompt criminal desistance by helping convicted felons to build a pro-social self-
concept.  By extending juror eligibility to felon-jurors, Maine recognizes their value 
as civic contributors and “delabels”141 former offenders.142 Such recognition helps 
former offenders reconceptualize their criminal pasts as valuable lessons, rather than 
shameful transgressions, allowing them to begin to build a coherent desistance 
narrative and find self-worth.143
In interviews with prospective and former felon-jurors in Maine, all participants 
indicated that inclusion in the jury process has given them a sense of self-esteem and 
self-confidence,144 mirroring the effects of voting in prior research.145 Former and 
                                                                                                     
140. Findings from this field study have previously been published in two separate articles. Binnall
(2018), supra note 5; Binnall, supra note 27.  In all instances, direct quotations use pseudonyms.  
141. Harrison M. Trice & Paul Michael Roman, Delabeling, Relabeling, and Alcoholics Anonymous,
17 SOC. PROBS. 538, 538 (1970).
142. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text; see also JOHN LOFLAND, DEVIANCE AND 
IDENTITY 227-28 (1969) (discussing “elevation ceremonies”); John Braithwaite & Stephen Mugford, 
Conditions of Successful Reintegration Ceremonies: Dealing with Juvenile Offenders, 34 BRIT. J. OF
CRIMINOLOGY 139 (1994) (discussing “integration ceremonies”); Thomas Meisenhelder, An 
Exploratory Study of Exiting from Criminal Careers, 15 CRIMINOLOGY 319 (1977); Thomas 
Meisenhelder, Becoming Normal: Certification as a Stage in Exiting from Crime, 3 DEVIANT BEHAV.:
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143. Meisenhelder (1982), supra note 142, at 138. 
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SELF AND SOCIETY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST (1934); HARRY STACK SULLIVAN,
CONCEPTIONS OF MODERN PSYCHIATRY (1947); “reflected appraisals,” see, e.g., John W. Kinch, A
Formalized Theory of Self-Concept, 68 AM. J. OF SOC. 481 (1963); Raymond Paternoster & LeeAnn Iovanni, 
The Labeling Perspective and Delinquency: An Elaboration of the Theory and an Assessment of the Evidence,
6 JUST. Q. 359 (1989); and “labeling theory,” see, e.g., Viktor Gecas & Michael L. Schwalbe, Beyond the 
Looking-Glass Self: Social Structure and Efficacy-Based Self-Esteem, 46 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 77 (1983); Ross L. 
Matsueda, Reflected Appraisals, Parental Labeling, and Delinquency: Specifying a Symbolic Interactionist 
Theory, 97 AM. J. OF SOC. 1577 (1992).  In the present study, while Maine’s inclusion of convicted felons 
bolstered participants’ self-concepts, participants also reported negative experiences that exacerbated the felon 
label. See Binnall (2018), supra note 5, at 21; see also HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION (1989); Henri 
Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Relations, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP 
RELATIONS 5 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds.,1986); Andreas Aresti, Virginia Eatough, & 
Belinda Brooks-Gordon, Doing Time After Time: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of Reformed 
Ex-Prisoners’ Experiences of Self-Change, Identity and Career Opportunities, 16 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 169 
(2010); Brenda Major & Laurie T. O’Brien, The Social Psychology of Stigma, 56 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 393
(2005); Devah Pager & Lincoln Quillian, Walking the Talk: What Employers Say Versus What They Do, 70 
AM. SOC. REV. 355 (2005); David M. Rasmussen, Rethinking Subjectivity: Narrative Identity and the Self, 21 
PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 159 (1996).
145. See MANZA ET AL., LOCKED OUT, supra note 25, at 137-63; Uggen et al., Pathways, supra note 
25, at 261-86; Miller & Spillane, supra note 25, at 422-23.
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prospective felon-jurors consistently discussed Maine’s policy of inclusion as a form 
of delabeling that mitigates the stigma of a criminal conviction:
I mean [felon jury inclusion] kinda sends a message that . . . the courts . . . won't 
always exclude you from . . . sitting on, you know, civic duty.  They may not always 
select you and you may not always be needed, but . . . you can say you tried.  You 
showed up when you got served.  [T]his side, you know, always having, again, 
having looked at things from the unlawful side and then the court says, "Well, we 
need you to, we need your help to make some of the right decisions."  And it's kinda 
cool . . . .  They said, "We're gonna hand you this responsibility.  Do you what you 
need to do with it."  You're not used to being, when you're not used to being given 
responsibility and always being left out because, "Oh, screw that guy.  You know, 
he's got a record.  We don't need his help.  We'll find somebody . . . who obeys the 
law and always makes the right decisions."  So it's like, wow.  They're gonna give 
me responsibility and, you know, try to get me to make the right decision.146
Another former felon-juror explained further:
I mean, [jury service] gives you, [the State] gives you a responsibility to do
somethin’.  I mean, anywhere else you go, you can’t do nothing,’ you’re like 
segregated from everybody else . . . .  Jury service made me feel better, because I 
mean, right now, as it stands, I mean, it feels like I’m being segregated from 
everybody else. I feel like . . . we’re back in time where it was blacks against whites, 
and blacks couldn’t go to white schools, blacks couldn’t sit at the front of the bus.  
Now it’s the same for convicted felons.147
Other participants with a felony criminal history who were called to jury duty 
but were ultimately dismissed shared similar sentiments.  For example: 
Well, [being a convicted felon] just makes, you know, it kind of makes you feel like 
you’re lower . . . than the rest of the community . . . like you ain’t no good or 
anything…It makes you feel kind of lower…like you’re not human, you know, or 
somethin’ like that.  But, it was alright when I got that [jury summons] . . . .   
Sometimes I feel really . . . ashamed that I’ve been in trouble, and when I was called
to serve on a jury trial, it’s more like, you know, it’s more like, “Oh, yeah. I’m part 
of society.148
Almost all participants went on to explain how the state’s acceptance altered 
how they viewed themselves and how prior experiences made them more valuable
jurors.149 In this way, participants reconceptualized their criminal pasts to find self-
worth:
I think it's very valuable because you also see the other side of things, you know?  
If you've never been there you don't really see that side of it.  But if you've already 
been there you can see both sides equally, rather than favoring to one side or the 
other.  I think it makes almost like a fairer juror than, you know, somebody that 
                                                                                                     
146. Binnall (2018), supra note 5, at 16 (quoting Mike, a convicted felon and former juror).
147. Id. at 16-17 (quoting Jack, a convicted felon and former juror).
148. Id. at 17 (quoting Keith, a convicted felon who was called and then dismissed from jury 
service).
149. See id. at 10-17.
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doesn't know the experiences from the other side.150
Other participants explained the exact mechanisms that make former offenders 
exceptional jurors, suggesting that those who have been through the criminal justice 
system have a unique ability to assess the voracity of evidence:
[Former offenders] have seen both sides.  You know what I mean . . . you can't 
bullshit a bullshitter.  You know what I mean?  Like you know, been there, done 
that . . . .  You can tell if someone's trying to bullshit you or someone, you know, 
you know the lies because you've said the lies.  You've lived that life.151
Like former offenders, court personnel in Maine tended to view inclusion as a 
means of delabeling and destigmatizing those with a felony criminal history:
I also think that there might be felons out there that to some extent, it might be 
redemptive to some extent, it might be rehabilitative for them to understand that, at 
least to this extent they’re permitted back into the functioning of society, and society 
still has a place for them, and still places value on their efforts, and is interested in 
their input.152
Court personnel also expressed confidence in felon-jurors, suggesting that those 
who have experienced the system bring something unique and valuable to the jury 
process, serving impartially and perhaps educating other jurors:
I think they’re gonna come with a lot more of an open mind versus somebody who 
has never been part of a system.  So, I just think that those folks, generally speaking, 
come to the table ready to listen to both sides equally.153
I definitely think that they might enlighten some of the other jurors. I just think they 
might cause the other members of the jury to think a little bit more about what a 
reasonable doubt is. And, I think because they have been subjected to the process, I 
don’t necessarily think that it’s a negative.154
Former offenders and courtroom personnel overwhelmingly categorized 
Maine’s inclusive juror eligibility criteria as an effective method with which to 
“delabel” those with a felony criminal history.  Both groups of participants also 
emphasized the value of a criminal record in the context of jury service.  For former 
offenders, this value helped them to create a coherent desistance narrative,155
rectifying their criminal pasts with their present law-abiding lives by conceiving of 
prior deviance as a valuable life experience to be exploited rather than hidden.156
This led to a more positive self-assessment.  Courtroom personnel seemingly 
corroborated this belief, also suggesting that felon-jurors bring value to the jury 
                                                                                                     
150. Id. at 19 (quoting Billy, a convicted felon and former juror).
151. Id. at 20 (quoting Lisa, a convicted felon and former juror).
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process, despite their prior deviance and negative contact with the criminal justice 
system.  In this way, data support the proposition that felon-juror inclusion operates 
to facilitate criminal desistance at the micro-level.
B.  Intermediate Level Impacts
At the intermediate level, civic inclusion impacts criminal desistance by 
providing former offenders pro-social roles.157 Research demonstrates that offenders 
who fill such roles are more likely to desist from criminal activity.158 Pro-social roles 
provide former offenders a guide for law-abiding behavior and constraints on 
potential deviance.159 Over time, studies suggest, the adoption of pro-social roles 
serves to alter former offenders’ self-concepts, such that desistance follows.160
In the present study, former offenders placed significant value on jury service, 
contemplating the exercise as one of utmost civic importance.  As one former felon-
juror explained, “When you're sitting on the legal side of it, you know, wow!  It's 
like, I can't believe I was sitting on that side and now I'm over here, you know, 
deciding someone else's fate.”161 Participants also described the ideal juror’s role, 
accurately detailing a juror’s duties:
If you're a juror and you're to do the job of a juror, in the state of Maine you have to
prove without a reasonable doubt that the person's guilty or not guilty.  So if the 
facts don't back up what's being, you know, brought against them then no, they 
shouldn't go to jail.  But I mean if everything's in black and white and they're guilty, 
then obviously they should be found guilty.162
Participants, both former jurors and prospective jurors, then described their 
experiences or intentions with respect to filling this pro-social role:
I just said . . . “you gotta go from what you really see.”  Cause, there was like two 
ladies that had never been on a jury, and they were like, “We’re not gonna make no 
decisions.”  And, I said, “You have to go with what you see.  The evidence.  
Everything that you get, that we’ve already been through, you have to weigh that 
out.  You can’t just say yes or no . . . .”  I even got up and put all this stuff on the 
chalkboard that, the pros and cons.163
I think I would more take in . . . the facts that were presented to the jury and go from 
there because I've known people that have had the same charge as me, and, you 
know, they pretty much get away with it.  Um, but, you know, there are some people 
that, you know, it depends on like why they did it.  Like in my instance.  I did it 
because I was homeless, I had no money, and I was trying to survive.  But if it were 
somebody that was doing it, you know, just because, you know, just for the thrill of 
                                                                                                     
157. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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161. Binnall (2018), supra note 5, at 10 (quoting Mike, a convicted felon and former juror).
162. Id. (quoting Jen, a convicted felon and a prospective juror).
163. Id. (quoting Chris, a convicted felon and a former juror).
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it, I would not be sympathetic whatsoever.164
These experiences and aspirations tend to contradict the inherent bias rationale 
for felon-juror exclusion.  All former offenders in the present study reported serving 
or intending to serve impartially, undermining the assumption that those who have 
had contact with the criminal justice system will uniformly favor criminal 
defendants.  Interviews with courtroom personnel, in particular judges’ opinions, 
align with these statements made by former offenders:
[W]ith the only information being that somebody's been convicted of a felony . . . 
you couldn't predict how they would react to, with just the basis of conviction it 
would it be difficult to predict how they would react or be fair in the state's case of 
a police officer testimony or that kind of a thing.  Having said that, as a judge I've 
found that most people who are convicted of crimes kind of understand that the 
system is doing its job and it's kind of viewed as a cost of doing business in many 
occasions.  And provided you treat them with a level of respect, I think they actually 
walk out of their conviction with a sense that the system works.165
I actually remember within the past month or two, having someone on trial for . . . 
residential burglary, and having someone in the jury pool with several burglary 
convictions, and thinking, “Ah, yeah, probably don’t want, you know.” But I mean,
it’s hard to know how that falls . . . .  The conventional argument would be that it 
favors the defendant because . . . there’ll be this sort of fraternity of criminals or 
what have you. But, there’s also an argument that if someone was convicted of 
something . . . they want to make sure that justice is done the next time around, and 
they’re going to convict someone if that person deserves it . . . maybe even if they 
don’t.166
Evidence in the present study seemingly supports prior research suggesting that 
former offenders are able to define pro-social civic roles and seek to fill those roles 
thoughtfully and effectively.  In the context of jury service, participants expressed a 
desire to “live up to” their accurate image of the ideal juror and courtroom personnel 
took issue with the inherent bias rationale, calling on prior experiences in questioning 
its veracity.  In sum, data tends to demonstrate that at the intermediate level, inclusion 
of convicted felons in the jury process may contribute to successful reentry and 
reintegration by offering former offenders a pro-social outlet they understand and 
seek to engage.
C.  Macro Level Impacts
At the macro level, Bazemore and Stinchcomb argue that reintegrating former 
offenders into the civic fold increases their social capital and builds collective 
efficacy, triggering wholehearted community investment in the reentry process.167
Such an investment helps to facilitate criminal desistance by curbing the social 
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disorganization characteristic of communities with high levels of incarceration.168
Accordingly, many scholars suggest that meaningful reintegration is a necessary 
precursor to, rather than an outcome of, successful reentry and criminal desistance.169
Shaw and McKay’s social disorganization theory holds that community level 
influences or ecological factors can contribute to criminality and undercut efforts to 
promote criminal desistance.170 Those factors include: economic status, degree of 
residential mobility, and the extent of ethnic heterogeneity.171 Later research 
identified additional factors, such as family arrangement, unemployment, structural 
density, and urbanization,172 which may also promote social disorganization and, in 
turn, criminal activity.173
In their seminal contribution to the theory, Rose and Clear argue that 
incarceration contributes to social disorganization.174 They suggest that 
incarceration and reentry can be conceptualized as “coercive mobility,” whereby 
“the effects of formal social efforts at Time 1 [imprisonment] produce neighborhood 
dynamics at Time 2 that are similar to those resulting from the voluntary mobility 
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typically modeled by theorists of social disorganization.”175 Incarceration prompts 
social disorganization directly by removing citizens from their communities for a 
period of time.176 Indirectly, incarceration prompts social disorganization through a 
vast network of record-based collateral sanctions that prevent former offenders from 
meaningfully reintegrating into their communities.177 The resulting social 
disorganization leads to delinquency by destroying social networks and, in turn, 
diminishing levels of social capital and collective efficacy in a given community.178
Felon-juror exclusion statutes are part of that broader effect.
Describing their experiences as jurors in Maine, several participants detailed 
their own personal encounters with members of the community.  In many instances, 
these ironic encounters with courtroom security staff vividly illustrate how civic 
immersion has the potential to create social networks and social capital:
It was like . . . I’d never had any problems. I was the same as everybody else in the 
room.  Even . . . one of the courtroom marshals, who was in there when I got 
sentenced, he knew who I was.  He was like, “I remember you.”  And then he got 
me coffee!  So that was pretty cool, I felt like the score had been . . . evened out.179
I felt like . . . I wasn’t trying to get away with something, it just felt like I was not 
judged by somebody.  Because, I was there the whole time.  Everybody, you know, 
all the guards treated me with respect like everybody else.  They fed us.  They, you 
know, it was just like a normal thing.180
Courtroom personnel—in particular, members of Maine’s judiciary—also 
discussed the value of reintegration.  Nearly all participants discussed inclusion as a 
positive policy, suggesting that collateral sanctions that permanently banish former 
offenders are ultimately counterproductive to communities:
You don’t want to be stigmatizing people or categorizing people, in a situation
where they . . . wear the scarlet “A” forever.  I mean, you know, Nathaniel 
Hawthorne is a graduate of Bowdoin, which is a school up here [in Maine] . . . .  
What we’re really saying to people is we’re not going to just put you in a box, we’re 
going to actually take a look at you and make a decision on you, and not simply 
[use] some category you might be in as a result of events which transpired 
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179. Binnall (2018), supra note 5, at 15-16 (quoting Doug, a convicted felon and former juror).
180. Id. at 16 (quoting Chris, a convicted felon and former juror).
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beforehand.181
I think one pays attention to what a person’s done in the past, but . . . it just can’t be 
the determinate . . . .  To say that you . . . did something at 19, 20, or 25, you know 
10, 20, 30, 25 years, whatever later, you are still that same person—you might be, 
you might not [be] . . . .  We have to have some optimism, as judges, that some 
people have turned things around.  And, a lot do, which is really encouraging.  Some 
don’t, which is . . . hard, but a lot of people get their lives in order, and so, I would 
certainly not want to hold that against them permanently.182
For other judges, the value of civic inclusion seemed obvious, as an appropriate 
means of helping former offenders feel as though they are part of the fabric of a 
society and that they have a hand in determining the direction of their community:
I see a benefit in bringing felons back into, or allowing felons to serve on juries, and that 
is the sense of reintegration into society that we are, the person has been convicted, 
they’ve served their time, that where society a whole, the belief in second chances, and 
that telling them that they can’t serve on juries is a punishment that is, that goes to the 
heart of what we do as citizens.  And, it would be better to have them vested in the rights 
of citizenship than to have them feel as if they’re alienated from those rights.183
Maine’s unique policy of including convicted felons in the jury process builds 
collective efficacy in the community by placing former offenders in pro-social 
situations with other members of the community and asking those offenders to use 
their prior experiences and knowledge to enhance an indispensable civic practice.  
Data tends to show that offenders do make pro-social community links through jury 
service (even with individuals assumedly outside of potential networks) and that 
courtroom personnel place value on these linkages, promoting such connections by 
treating felon-jurors as they would any other prospective juror.  In these ways, Maine 
realizes the value of social networks, collective efficacy, and the exercise of informal 
social control.184 These findings lend support to the hypothesis that felon-juror 
inclusion ostensibly promotes criminal desistance at the macro level.
VI. THE BENEFITS OF THE “MAINE WAY”
In his study of American democracy, Tocqueville famously wrote:
[The jury] should be regarded as a free school which is always open and in which 
each juror learns his rights, comes into daily contact with the best-educated and most 
enlightened members of the upper classes, and is given practical lessons in the law, 
lessons which the advocate’s efforts, the judge’s advice, and also the very passions 
of the litigants bring within his mental grasp.  I think that the main reason for the 
practical intelligence and the political good sense of Americans is their long 
experience with juries . . . .185
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Like Tocqueville, the Supreme Court has long recognized the value of jury service 
and the transformative power of the jury.186 Historically, judges have used the jury as a 
public classroom, educating jurors on law and politics.187 Still, the Supreme Court 
seemingly discounts this fundamental benefit of the jury system in the context of former 
offenders, tacitly endorsing the exclusion of convicted felons from jury service.188
Maine, on the other hand, prioritizes inclusion and exploits the educative function of the 
jury.  In turn, Maine ostensibly eschews common, empirically tenuous conceptualizations 
of criminal offenders and the threat they allegedly represent, while championing former 
offenders’ strengths and, as data tends to demonstrate, perhaps prompting successful 
criminal desistance in the process.
A.  Overcoming Outmoded, Unsupported Presumptions
At the time of the Founding, the notion of “civil death” was an accepted part of 
American jurisprudence.189 Jurisdictions prohibited convicted criminals from taking 
part in civic activities, including jury service, principally as retribution for their 
indiscretions.  Ostracism was also thought to serve as a general deterrent to other 
potential deviants who assumedly feared banishment from their communities.190 In 
this way, the rationales for civil death took on a moral quality, pitting reputable law-
abiding citizens against those who strayed from recognized law.  
Criminologist David Garland argues that tactics like this implicate the
“criminology of the other.”191 Professedly focused on the “upholding of law and 
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order, the assertion of absolute moral standards, [and] the affirmation of tradition 
and commonsense,”192 the criminology of the other presumes that those who have 
committed criminal offenses are fundamentally different than those without a 
criminal record.193 As Garland notes, “[t]here can be no mutual intelligibility, no 
bridge of understanding, no real communications between ‘us’ and ‘them.’”194
Such retributive justifications in favor of excluding convicted felons from jury 
service operate in a type of feedback loop, authorizing banishment because of the 
differentness attributed to convicted felons, while also corroborating convicted 
felons’ anti-social distinctiveness by pointing to their ostracism from civic life.  As 
one scholar explains in the context of felon-voter disenfranchisement:
Disenfranchisement is based not upon what we believe but upon what it allows us to 
believe. The notions that felons have freely chosen to renege on a social contract or are 
morally defective outsiders lacking the necessary virtues for political citizenship follow 
from, rather than explain, a pre-existing sense that ex felons cannot be members of the 
community.  This deep impulse contributes to a self-perpetuating, self-congratulatory 
belief system that shapes our conceptions of citizenship and criminality, and that forms 
the basis of ex-felon disenfranchisement.195
Modern criminal justice policy has tended to move away from moral 
justifications for civic banishment.196 Assessments, evaluations, and actuarial 
tabulations of risk now drive many of these policies.197 This “new penology”198
ostensibly retreats from the criminology of the other—though its influence is 
undeniable—calling on categorical risk accounting in an effort to protect “us” from 
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“them.”199 As is the case with felon-juror exclusion, many of the collateral 
consequences of a criminal conviction are now premised on risk-centric rationales.200
Justifications for felon-juror exclusion hold that convicted felons, if allowed to 
serve, would jeopardize the adjudicative process.201 Presumably, a lack of character 
and an inherent bias make the presence of convicted felons a liability for any jury 
system. Though initially imposed as a matter of retribution, felon-juror exclusion 
statutes have taken on a decidedly deficit-based, risk-centric premise.202
Maine’s inclusive jury system does not differentiate between felon-jurors and 
non-felon-jurors.203 In both instances, Maine employs voir dire, an established 
screening mechanism for assessing each prospective juror—felon and non-felon—
using similar criteria.204 By doing so, Maine accepts those with a felony criminal 
history and dispels categorical assumptions, overcoming the criminology of the 
other, while appropriately confronting alleged risk by using tailored, individualized 
procedures.205
Arguably, Maine’s approach goes even further than simply dispelling myths 
about those with a felony criminal conviction.  Inclusion also recognizes the qualities 
and attributes of those with a felony criminal history.  This perspective stands in stark 
contrast to deficit-based models focused exclusively on the threat convicted felons 
may pose.  In this way, Maine’s approach, though long-standing, is decidedly 
progressive, aligning with contemporary criminological research supporting 
strengths-based approaches to reentry and reintegration.206
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B.  Criminal Desistance: The Not-So-Hidden Reward for Inclusion
Bazemore and Stinchcomb have argued that civic engagement promotes 
successful reintegration at the micro, intermediate, and macro levels.207 Theories of 
criminal desistance support their hypothesis,208 as does prior empirical research on 
felon-voter enfranchisement.209 The present field study in Maine was the first to 
focus on Bazemore and Stinchcomb’s argument in the context of jury service and 
the data tends to show that like felon-voter enfranchisement, felon-juror inclusion 
has the potential to facilitate successful reintegration and criminal desistance at the 
micro, intermediate, and macro levels. 
At the micro level, by extending juror eligibility to convicted felons, the state 
corroborates former offenders’ reformation.  Inclusion sends a signal to former 
offenders that they have ‘done their time’ and are now welcome back into the civic 
fold.  Former offenders then seemingly internalize that signal, in line with prior 
research on identity formation, often finding value in their deviant pasts.210 In this 
way, Maine helps former offenders build individual desistance narratives that help 
to rectify internal conflicts between a criminal past and present lawfulness.211
At the intermediate level, including convicted felons in the jury process provides 
them a pro-social role to fill.  Convicted felons understand that role and seek to take 
part in the process thoughtfully.  In line with structural theories of criminal 
desistance, such role formation and adoption provide former offenders a template to 
“live up to,” as well as constraints that have the potential to curb deviance.212 In the 
present study, former and prospective felon-jurors understood the ‘ideal juror’ role, 
sought to fill that role, and seemingly adjusted their behaviors accordingly.  The 
experiences of courtroom personnel support that conclusion.213
At the macro level, Maine’s inclusive juror eligibility criteria create 
opportunities for pro-social contact between “us” and “them.”  Former and 
prospective felon-jurors report a host of interactions that gave rise to feelings of self-
confidence and validation—contacts that build social capital and collective 
efficacy.214 Courtroom personnel recognize this positive feature of felon-juror 
inclusion, noting that permanent exclusions obliterate any hope of former offenders 
building meaningful community connections and bringing the already marginalized 
back into pro-social civic contexts.215
Taken together, data derived from the present study suggests that jury service 
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can transform those who take part.  In line with prior studies demonstrating that 
taking part in the jury process prompts other forms of civic participation and bolsters 
citizens’ views of the legitimacy of the justice system,216 jury service may also give 
rise to additional societal benefits by stimulating criminal desistance mechanisms 
and facilitating the successful reentry of citizens living with a felony criminal history.  
To be sure, evidence does not suggest that Maine’s reentering population is not 
without struggle.  To the contrary, many participants expressed reentry frustrations, 
in particular in the areas of housing and employment.217 Still, those same participants 
noted the significance of their inclusion in Maine’s jury system, noting that while 
jury service alone will not erase the stigma of a felony conviction, it is a meaningful 
first step toward full community acceptance.
In an age when the number of jury trials has dwindled,218 the present study offers 
yet another reminder of the importance of this vital democratic institution.  The jury 
is a place where members of the community converge in an exercise of popular 
sovereignty and “active liberty.”219 Through their willingness to share their 
experiences, Maine’s felon-jurors and courtroom personnel provide vital evidence of 
exactly how the jury can alter an individual and bolster a community.
VII. CONCLUSION
As noted at the start of this article, Maine is unabashedly unique.  Tucked away 
in the corner of our nation, Mainers pride themselves on their individualism and 
tradition.  In her poignant portrayal of life in a small village, Lura Beam succinctly 
captures the culture of Maine:
The beliefs held most firmly were two: first, individualism; and second, the 
continuity of customs approved by long experience.  Individualism meant the 
person’s right to be fully himself, with his corresponding obligations of self-denial 
and self-control . . . .  These channels were prescribed, but still a person might depart 
from the standard without hurting anyone but himself; they were not compulsory . . 
. .  Everyone of every age was an individualist.  If the hamlet had ever chosen itself 
a banner, it could have been that yellow flag with the coiled rattlesnake and the 
motto, “Don’t tread on me.”220
Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that Maine’s approach to and acceptance of 
felon-jurors differs from that of all other U.S. jurisdictions and is a point of pride for 
its residents.  For all participants in this study, felon-juror inclusion “is the way it is” 
and makes sense.  Evidence supports their contentions and validates their traditions.  
Jury systems across the country could benefit from this aspect of “The Maine Way.”
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